Bush meets the press

[Natoma]

They found neither the intent nor the tools during their limited time there before they were kicked out, and apparently neither have we after our extended time there.

You're completely bonkers and have apparently checked out of reality if you believe that.

Care to back up that assertion with cold hard facts, and not empty assumptions and inferences?

As I said, intent is a difficult thing to gauge. Kay, nor the weapons inspectors, found any evidence for an ongoing weapons program after 1998. So, where do you get your non-bonkers and checked-into-reality version of things from?

I'm just reporting what's been said. I'm putting no personal spin on anything.

 

[RussSchultz]

http://abcnews.go.com/sections/World/WorldNewsTonight/david_kay_statement031002-4.html

From Kay's mouth, directly quoted:

We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.
...
A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.
...
<long list of other examples snipped>
...
In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment efforts, we have been faced with a systematic sanitization of documentary and computer evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected of WMD work.

He quite explicitely spells out documented intent, tools, participants, and subterfuge that was ongoing even after OIF concluded.

And your invokation of Kay to back up your assertion shows me you don't spend a moment of your own time educating yourself.

 

[Joe DeFuria]

I'm just reporting what's been said. I'm putting no personal spin on anything.

So then obviously, your sources are putting the spin on themselves.

 

[Natoma]

Then it seems that there is a difference of what/where is coming from Kay.

From CNN:

Two days after resigning as the Bush administration's top weapons inspector in Iraq, David Kay said Sunday that his group found no evidence Iraq had stockpiled unconventional weapons before the U.S.-led invasion in March.

So we know there are no weapons.

Despite not finding any WMD, Kay said his team found that the Iraqi senior leadership "had an intention to continue to pursue their WMD activities. That they, in fact, had a large number of WMD-related activities."

Kay predicted investigators would find that Iraqi scientists were "working on developing weapons or weapons concepts that they had not moved into actual production."

In the first part, Kay makes a definitive statement that the Iraqi had the intent to continue to pursue WMD activities, and had the programs.

But then he goes on to make a prediction that evidence would be found that the Iraqis had the intent and the programs? That seems rather contradictory.

So on one hand, we know they had programs and the intent, but on the other hand, we're predicting that evidence will be found of the programs and the intent? C'mon Russ. You have to admit that's pretty laughable. The credibility strains.

And yet more "definitive allegations":

Kay also raised the possibility -- one he first discussed in a weekend interview with "The Sunday Telegraph" of London -- that clues about banned weapons programs might reside across Iraq's western border.

"There is ample evidence of movement to Syria before the war -- satellite photographs, reports on the ground of a constant stream of trucks, cars, rail traffic across the border. We simply don't know what was moved," Kay said.

Joe,

This quote seems to sum up his comments on the matter thus far:

Although his team concluded that Iraq did not possess large amounts of weapons of mass destruction ready for use, that does not necessarily mean it posed no imminent threat, he said.

"That is a political judgment, not a technical judgment."

Playing politics with words in order to "deflect" blame or keep the case going for war Joe? Spin did you say?

 

[RussSchultz]

Then it seems that there is a difference of what/where is coming from Kay.

The difference is one is quoting Kay, the other is paraphrasing what Kay said. Which one do you think is more accurate?

For Christ sake, CNN had a headline that stated the Zarqawi letter found recently was a plea from Iraqi's looking for help from Iraq (where in fact, the Zarqawi letter was a lament to Al Qaeda leadership that Iraqis don't want much of anything to do with the Jihadist goals of Al Qaeda and that he needed help fomenting unrest)

Obviously monkey's do most of CNN's reporting.

 

[Natoma]

More seemingly contradictory stuff from Kay:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54353-2004Jan27_2.html

"If the weapons programs existed on the scale we anticipated," Kay said, "we would have found something that leads to that conclusion. Instead, we found other evidence that points to something else." Kay reiterated his view that 85 percent of the Iraq Survey Group's job has been completed and that "the major pieces of the puzzle" have been covered.

......................

In the interview yesterday, Kay said the ISG had found some "contemporary documents" that proved Iraq destroyed weapons in the mid-1990s -- steps that were not reported to U.N. inspectors.

Senior Iraqi scientists interviewed by Kay admitted hiding their chemical and biological weapons programs in the early 1990s. In 1995, however, Hussein's son-in-law Hussein Kamal, who directed the illegal weapons programs, defected. At about that time, the scientists said they tried unsuccessfully to convince U.N. inspectors that they had destroyed their weapons and agents. They tried to "come clean, but we wouldn't believe them," Kay said.

Kay said the Iraqi scientists did not have complete records to back up their claims because the destruction had taken place under pressure to keep it secret from U.N. inspectors. In addition to documents, Kay said, ISG members interviewed people who confirmed some of the destruction, but far from all of it. "That will be impossible, and there will always be some doubts," Kay said.

Kay said he believes Hussein may have been pursuing a course of "constructive ambiguity" before the war, bluffing about having weapons to give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent. "Saddam wanted to enjoy the benefits of having chemical and biological weapons without having to pay the costs," Kay said.

What's that? No weapons and no programs? Bluffing you say?

Kay's going back and forth on this topic, ranging from "We know he had programs and intent" to "We will find proof of programs and intent," along with the "It's all and only the CIA's fault!" mantra coming from him and the White House, speaks volumes about politicking

 

[RussSchultz]

So you're saying he lied when reporting to congress in October?

 

[digitalwanderer]

Gads! Can we get away from all these icky facts and get back to some good old fashioned rhetoric please?

Bush is evil, scary, and clueless...he has to go!!!!

 

[Natoma]

So you're saying he lied when reporting to congress in October?

I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that his answers thus far have ranged from the "definitive" to the "we will find proof" to "I believe..."

That is simply "good" politicking, and note I am not making a good or bad evaluation of this, merely stating what it is in its purest form. The only position he hasn't waffled on in some way shape or form is whether or not the CIA is to blame.

 

[Natoma]

Gads! Can we get away from all these icky facts and get back to some good old fashioned rhetoric please?

Bush is evil, scary, and clueless...he has to go!!!!

Evil? Nah. Scary? Nah. Clueless?

 

[Silent_One]

Spies, Lies, and Weapons:
What Went Wrong
by Kenneth M. Pollack
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/pollack.htm

I began my career as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA, where I saw an earlier generation of technical analysts mistakenly conclude that Saddam Hussein was much further away from having a nuclear weapon than the post-Gulf War inspections revealed. I later moved on to the National Security Council, where I served two tours, in 1995-1996 and 1999-2001. During the latter stint the intelligence community convinced me and the rest of the Clinton Administration that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programs following the withdrawal of the UN inspectors, in 1998, and was only a matter of years away from having a nuclear weapon. In 2002 I wrote a book called Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, in which I argued that because all our other options had failed, the United States would ultimately have to go to war to remove Saddam before he acquired a functioning nuclear weapon. Thus it was with more than a little interest that I pondered the question of why we didn't find in Iraq what we were so certain we would.

Nevertheless, the preliminary findings of the ISG will probably not change dramatically, at least not in their broad contours. Kay summarized those findings in his October testimony.


Iraq had preserved some of its technological nuclear capability from before the Gulf War. However, no evidence suggested that Saddam had undertaken any significant steps after 1998 toward reconstituting the program to build nuclear weapons or to produce fissile material.


Little evidence surfaced that Iraq had continued to produce chemical weapons; only a minimal amount of clandestine research had been done on them. For instance, the production line at the Fallujah II facility (the plant that intelligence officers believed was Iraq's principal site for making chlorine, an ingredient in some chemical-warfare agents) turned out to be in derelict condition and had not operated since the Gulf War. Nevertheless, Iraqi officials seemed to believe that they could convert existing civilian pharmaceutical plants to chemical-weapons production, and that Saddam was interested in their ability to do so.

Iraq made determined efforts to retain some capabilities for biological warfare. It maintained an undeclared network of laboratories and other facilities within the apparatus of its security services, and as Kay put it, "this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production." To disguise its biological-warfare programs Baghdad had scientists working on overt projects that were closely related to proscribed activities.


Iraq seemed to have been most aggressive in pursuing proscribed missiles. In Kay's words, "detainees and cooperative sources indicate that beginning in 2000 Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of at least [240 miles] and up to [620 miles] and that measures to conceal these projects from [UN inspectors] were initiated in late 2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors." The Iraqis were also working on clustering liquid-fueled rocket engines in order to produce a longer-range missile, and were trying to convert certain surface-to-air missiles into surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 150 miles. Most troubling of all, the ISG uncovered evidence that from 1999 to 2002 Iraq had negotiated with North Korea to buy technology for No Dong missiles, which have a range of 800 miles.

Did Kay say anything different now?

 

[Natoma]

Yes, he did. From my post above:

Kay said he believes Hussein may have been pursuing a course of "constructive ambiguity" before the war, bluffing about having weapons to give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent. "Saddam wanted to enjoy the benefits of having chemical and biological weapons without having to pay the costs," Kay said.

 

[Silent_One]

Yes, he did. From my post above:

Kay said he believes Hussein may have been pursuing a course of "constructive ambiguity" before the war, bluffing about having weapons to give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent. "Saddam wanted to enjoy the benefits of having chemical and biological weapons without having to pay the costs," Kay said.

Read it again...that's befoe the war Kay's talking about in your quote, not after the war, which is what Kay's reporting about in my quotes

 

[Natoma]

That entire section began with:

In the interview yesterday,..........

The date of the article is January 28, 2004. What are you talking about?

The "before the war" part is about what he believes Saddam's motives were before Gulf War II in 2003, i.e. hindsight, not when he actually made that assessment.

 

[Silent_One]

The date of the article is January 28, 2004. What are you talking about?

Before the war Saddam was "bluffing about having weapons to give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent" as said by Kay in the January 28, 2004 report. In Kay's October report, after the war, and as as far as I can tell there is no different in Kay's January update, Kay found that the Iraq

...maintained an undeclared network of laboratories and other facilities within the apparatus of its security services, and as Kay put it, "this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production."

 

[Natoma]

From an earlier post:

Despite not finding any WMD, Kay said his team found that the Iraqi senior leadership "had an intention to continue to pursue their WMD activities. That they, in fact, had a large number of WMD-related activities."

Kay predicted investigators would find that Iraqi scientists were "working on developing weapons or weapons concepts that they had not moved into actual production."

In the first part, Kay makes a definitive statement that the Iraqi had the intent to continue to pursue WMD activities, and had the programs.

But then he goes on to make a prediction that evidence would be found that the Iraqis had the intent and the programs? That seems rather contradictory.

So on one hand, we know they had programs and the intent, but on the other hand, we're predicting that evidence will be found of the programs and the intent?

 

[Silent_One]

In the first part, Kay makes a definitive statement that the Iraqi had the intent to continue to pursue WMD activities, and had the programs.

No. Kay says that they had the intent and "a large number of WMD-related activities". As I pointed out those "activities" consist of "clandestine capabilitys" "suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production."

But then he goes on to make a prediction that evidence would be found that the Iraqis had the intent and the programs? That seems rather contradictory

No. Kay predicted that the inspectors would find that the Iraqis were working on wepons or concepts, not intent. They already had intent.

Why do you read into this something that it's not?

 

[Natoma]

In the first part, Kay makes a definitive statement that the Iraqi had the intent to continue to pursue WMD activities, and had the programs.

No. Kay says that they had the intent and "a large number of WMD-related activities". As I pointed out those "activities" consist of "clandestine capabilitys" "suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW-capable facilities, and continuing R&D—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production."

Uh, activities isn't programs? Clandestine capabilities isn't programs? Continuing R&D isn't programs?

Now we're just mincing semantics, but that seems like a pretty big stretch.

But then he goes on to make a prediction that evidence would be found that the Iraqis had the intent and the programs? That seems rather contradictory

No. Kay predicted that the inspectors would find that the Iraqis were working on wepons or concepts, not intent. They already had intent.

Why do you read into this something that it's not?

Uh, if you're working on the weapons and the concepts, you certainly have the intent to produce WMD.

 

[Silent_One]

Now we're just mincing semantics, but that seems like a pretty big stretch

Lets see...Natoma says"In the first part, Kay makes a definitive statement ....
No semantics there.

Then natoma says..."But then he goes on to make a prediction that evidence would be found that the Iraqis had the intent and the programs? That seems rather contradictory."

Now for the life of me I don't see Kay repeating the words "intent" and "programs" anywhere.

Your right though, somebody (not me, not Kay) is playing semantics.

 

[Natoma]

Despite not finding any WMD, Kay said his team found that the Iraqi senior leadership "had an intention to continue to pursue their WMD activities. That they, in fact, had a large number of WMD-related activities."

Kay predicted investigators would find that Iraqi scientists were "working on developing weapons or weapons concepts that they had not moved into actual production."

Despite not finding any WMD, Kay said his team found that the Iraqi senior leadership had the intent, as well as a large number of WMD-related activities. Now I don't know what you define as "activities," but that sure sounds to me to be "programs". You stated R&D for instance. Well how in the world do you get R&D if you don't have a program? I mean c'mon. That is a definitive statement that they have proof that Iraqi senior leadership had the intent and the "activities" related to WMD.

Kay predicted, i.e. expects, investigators would find that Iraqi scientists were working on or developing weapons or weapons concepts. If you're working on developing weapons or weapons concepts, is that not the intent to produce WMD? And since Kay made a prediction about this, that means that he had no evidence. He simply believed that this would occur, that evidence would be found that the Iraqis had the intent to make weapons, and were developing said weapons.

There is no semantics whatsoever in there. You show me different.