Subjective Oblivion

alexsok

Regular
http://www.naturalism.org/death.htm

"At this point it is likely that our intuitions about experience "jumping the gap" have been stretched beyond the breaking point. We have moved from the fairly uncontroversial fact of the continuity of one person's experience (no subjective gaps in consciousness during a lifetime) to this seemingly outlandish notion that consciousness, for itself, is impervious to death or indeed to any sort of objective interruption. But let me quickly reiterate my main points in order to reinstate some plausibility. 1) It is a mundane, although contingent, fact of life that when I die other subjects exist, hence subjectivity certainly is immune to my death in these circumstances. 2) If I am unconscious for any length of time I don't experience that interval; I am always "present"; this is personal subjective continuity. 3) If, after a period of unconsciousness, the transformed person who wakes up is not me there still won't be any perceived gap in awareness. The person who wakes up feels, as I did (hence "still" feels), that they've always been present. There has been no prior experience of not being present for them, nor when I stop existing do I have such an experience; this is generic subjective continuity. 4) Death and birth are "functionally equivalent" to the sort of transformation in 3), so again there will be no perceived gap, no nothingness of non-experience into which the subject might fall. Generic subjective continuity holds across any objective discontinuities in the existence of conscious beings."

My question is, even though I agree with all of what is said in the article, isn't it really a question of semantics since no matter that the subjective experience never ceases, we, as in "us" will still no be ourselves anymore and it will therefore be "oblivion" for us?

The aritlce itself says:
It isn't conventional immortality (not even as good as living in others' memory, some might think), since there is no "one" who survives, just the persistence of subjectivity for itself.

And then rounds it up with a question towards the end:
Why, if experience continues anyway, is it so terribly important that it continue within this set of personal characteristics, memories, and body? If we are no longer haunted by nothingness, then dying may seem more like the radical refreshment of subjectivity than its extinction.

So what if experience continues anyways? Isn't it the same as saying "so what that other people continue to exist after we vanish, the foundation was always there"... something here doesn't click in me... the premises are solid but the conclusions don't sit well with me at all...
 
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