darkblu said:
k, Pana, i believe we need to try and define the crux of the problem with psp and homebrew. you say sony couldn't have proved this even if they wanted to. i think that given sony had *any* plans to allow homebrew, they could have provided for a secure (anyway as secure as it is now circa fw2.7) pspos+xbm+homebrew environment at no extra hw cost (i.e. hw sandboxing ala cell, etc).
simple facts for consideration:
* since fw2.01 all user-space code, signed or pegged, got a much tighter isolation from the kernel.
* signed apps have never been able to, and still cannot flash the fw without a validly-signed fw image. in this regards it really does not matter how signed a code is, it's a matter of whether it's able to produce signed fw images or not.
Various loader and System options configurators that came out for FW 1.50 and 1.00 seem to prove the opposite: FW 1.00 AFAIK basically forgot to check for the signature and Flash ROM was quite accessible.
Under FW 1.00 they were not exploiting an oveflow in a kernel component and under that FW and under FW 1.50 (before the TIFF overflow bug) Flash RAM was accessible and thus ruinable.
Even the UMD drive was accessible as well as it was possible to run ripped games from Memory Stick.
* there's nothing wrong with running unsigned code with a bunch of priviledged APIs disabled - you can cut off access to UMD totally if need be, put other system services (like XMB) in kernel space, and let the party begin. in this case your paltform is as safe as its kernel-mode componets - i.e. unless you have some tiff buffer exploit in your kernel space, you're safe. but if you have such exploits a homebrew-closed system does not give you any safety (see the situation with fw2.0 and homebrew)
see, that's why i think it was entirely a metter of desire on SCE's part. hence the goto 10 : )
I think that the separation you suggest is still not how Sony wanted to do things, probably they did not even think homebrew coders would throw themselves at it so quickly and there is also the piracy issue: for quite a long time people could use programs to boot ripped games from MS which showed that they were unprepared for such an occurrence.
You have to remember the time factor, PSP as we now know it had a quite rushed development cycle and that included its OS as well and it was the first time SCE released a console with an upgradeable firmware (let's forget to mention that failure known as Sony Electronics PSX).
There was certainly a lack of desire to allow homebrew, but I will still keep repeating until they come out with a homebrew kit for the PSP (not impossible if they feel that the system is now more secure against exploits... they strangely mention software bootable from Memory Stick as one of the features they will introduce in a future FW revision...
) that the security side of the problem was one of the main factors why they did not push for it.
It is better to put a tested and secured software layer between XMB and homebrew programs rather than complicating XMB+PSPOS's design itself more than necessary.
They also saw very LITTLE benefit from homebrew programs and we will keep on insisting that on PLAYSTATION 3 the situation is different.
Even thinkng about the odds what do we have on the table.
Home PlayStation consoles:
1.) PlayStation NetYaroze program (strangely enough code designed for the Yaroze environment could not run on stock PlayStation's
) with included documentation and toolchain.
2.) PlayStation 2 Linux program (strangely enough again code dsigned for the PS2Linux environment could not run on stock PlayStation 2's) with included documentation and toolchain.
3.) PLAYSTATION 3... PS3Linux announced in some form, major documentation for CELL and for nVIDIA G7x class GPU's as well as OpenGL ES + Cg documentation and header files already available, CBE chip toolchain already available and PS3Linux specific toolchain and documentation to be delivered with PS3Linux mentioned on record by SCE executives, etc...
PSP:
1.) SCE never distributed any documentation any toolchain. SCE never promised any documentation or any toolchain and delays for a long time the publication of a patch to GNU binutils for the VFPU meanwhile it emphasizes how the platform is locked down and how important is DRM to them meanwhile they are pitching it to movie executives and music executives around the world trying to launch the UMD Video and UMD Audio formats as viable business options for their proprietary and uber locked down device where they were in total control and you should trust them.
The situation of Blu-Ray cannot really be compared to the UMD Video one: a good fit for saying that we would be comparing apples to oranges.
[ed: for the record, the original fw2.0 tiff exploit does not provide kernel-space access, but the example still stands]
The TIFF exploit still allows too much as being able to indirectly access the Flash ROM and downgrade to 1.50
.