Apple A9X SoC

As the reported battery life and the battery size are both identical, average system TDP must be pretty close as well
you might wanna recheck that

Similar battery: 39.7 Wh (Mac) vs 38.5 Wh (iPad) MAC benefits ~3% more battery
Similar screen size: 12" (Mac) vs 12.9" (iPad) MAC benefits ~23% smaller screen
Similar screen resolution: 2304x1440 (Mac) vs 2732x2048 (iPad) MAC benefits (ipad has ~68% greater resolution)

all the advantages are on the one side, which compounds of course, Im guessing if you equalized the ipad with the mac you would see about 40-50% longer battery life
 
Does anybody have a Macbook 12" 2015 running El Capitan, to test Kraken and Octane V2?, if not I have a meeting near an Apple Store tomorrow, so I'll try and run the aforementioned on the Pro and Macbook 2015
I ran these tests on my MacBook, Early 2015, 1.2 GHz.

Kraken score: 1612.4 ms
Octane score: 20142

Kraken details:
Code:
===============================================
RESULTS (means and 95% confidence intervals)
-----------------------------------------------
Total:                       1612.4ms +/- 1.2%
-----------------------------------------------

  ai:                         304.1ms +/- 3.2%
    astar:                    304.1ms +/- 3.2%

  audio:                      476.1ms +/- 2.0%
    beat-detection:           109.5ms +/- 3.2%
    dft:                      192.8ms +/- 2.3%
    fft:                       71.1ms +/- 3.7%
    oscillator:               102.7ms +/- 6.5%

  imaging:                    319.6ms +/- 2.7%
    gaussian-blur:            122.4ms +/- 5.6%
    darkroom:                 115.4ms +/- 5.6%
    desaturate:                81.8ms +/- 4.5%

  json:                       104.9ms +/- 3.3%
    parse-financial:           64.5ms +/- 5.2%
    stringify-tinderbox:       40.4ms +/- 7.7%

  stanford:                   407.7ms +/- 1.0%
    crypto-aes:               101.4ms +/- 2.3%
    crypto-ccm:                72.4ms +/- 3.4%
    crypto-pbkdf2:            162.6ms +/- 2.1%
    crypto-sha256-iterative:   71.3ms +/- 3.0%

Octane details:
Code:
Richards
22883
Core language features
Deltablue
27829
Core language features
Crypto
24389
Bit & Math operations
Raytrace
50393
Core language features
/row
EarleyBoyer
38442
Memory & GC
Regexp
2626
Strings & arrays
Splay
13275
Memory & GC
SplayLatency
7161
GC latency
/row
NavierStokes
24486
Strings & arrays
pdf.js
17324
Strings & arrays
Mandreel
18152
Virtual machine
MandreelLatency
12783
Compiler latency
/row
GB Emulator
29987
Virtual machine
CodeLoad
18010
Loading & Parsing
Box2DWeb
28250
Bit & Math operations
zlib
42449
asm.js
Typescript
30866
Virtual machine & GC

To make sure my MacBook wouldn't heat up, I ran these benchmarks while it was next to the air conditioner running in cold mode. But even when I ran Kraken eight times (and Octane once) away from the AC, the scores didn't change by much (1587.5 ms - 1652.6 ms and 20307).
 
I don't have numbers, but it matters a lot less than many people think, especially when you are comparing between two deep out-of-order cores (which both Core M and A9 are).
This is conventional wisdom.
It doesn't sit well with me however. I can´t quantify the x86 architectural cost, but it seems to be greater than the first order approximation would indicate.
To keep to the thread topic, the A9x sets the finger on the sore spot - how is it that Intel, who has the best fabs, a crystal clear architectural focus, tons of CPU design experience, and an R&D budget that is effectively limitless, still can't make a competitive x86 mobile chip? Surely, if the x86 penalty was small, all the undeniable strengths of Intel would compensate several times over?
And it is not for lack of trying either, they developed a new implementation of x86 to specifically go after low power applications, improved it iteratively, and when that failed to find customers Intel threw literally several billions in cash (contra revenue) at the manufacturers to get them to use their CPUs. Other than very effectively killing the low power x86 market for AMD, this has pretty much accomplished nothing.

At some point you have to take a couple of steps back and reassess the situation. If Intel really tries, and still can't produce competitive solutions, why is that? The only thing I can come up with is that the architectural baggage of x86 for some reason is a heavier burden than propaganda/convensional wisdom would have us believe. Is it that the underlying micro-ops at the end of the day still have to run x86 code, so that the burden of the ISA extends beyond the initial code translation which is typically said to represent the "cost"? Is it that Intel preserves bug-for-bug compatible circuit implementations of the growing legacy that are inefficient? Or that....

I just don't get it. But papers like this (requires membership/payment unfortunately, but the gist can be had from the abstract, and the results have just gotten more emphasized recently), combined with processors like the A9x or the new batch of ARM64 cores definitely raises the old questions about x86 inefficiencies again.
 
I think the reason why Intel is not successful in the mobile phone market is not because the performance of their SoC. Their performance/watt is actually competitive, but other factors make them unpopular.
And considering that now the phone SoC market is basically a cost game, it's not a market that Intel have much competitive edge.
 
I think the reason why Intel is not successful in the mobile phone market is not because the performance of their SoC. Their performance/watt is actually competitive, but other factors make them unpopular.
And considering that now the phone SoC market is basically a cost game, it's not a market that Intel have much competitive edge.
No argument that there is little profit to be had for Intel in mobile. But that should not be twisted into an implicit excuse that "they never really tried to compete anyway". They did. To the tune of generations of dedicated products and several billions of dollars.
Even if we disregard other factors that make them unpopular, the competitiveness of Cherry Trail vs. FinFET alternatives is not clear. Why is it not clear? And if we avoid Intels mobile x86 cores, and look at their crown jewel, Skylake, a core which is destined to go into the full range of Windows clients and power servers up to Very Big Iron Indeed, Core M still doesn't manage to fully convince against A9x, a chip made on a foundry process, and that doesn't benefit from binning.
Intels Holt made a presentation the other day where he defended the notion that Intel still holds a significant lead in process tech over TSMC and Samsung. If we leave his need to make such a presentation in the first place to the side, then the obvious next question becomes why this doesn't translate into clearly superior products, given Intels other technology strengths.
Personally, I'm starting to lean towards that the x86 carries an architectural and legacy cost that is larger than we have been led to believe, and that this has been obscured by Intels process and optimization pedigree. Intel still has significant advantages in process, resources for layout optimization and associated, design experience, overall circuit technology and so on. That ARM products can compete at all doesn't really support the assertion that the cost of x86 legacy is effectively negligeable.
But I really don't know. My knowledge just isn't deep enough. This is a place where people with some insight seem to sometimes be willing to share it, without much forum noise. The observation is clear, the reasons why are not.
 
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If Intel were really trying, they would actually make something from ground up with low power applications in mind, instead of simply tweaking a very old design into something not very good (e.g. the original Atom). Of course, they did something better later, but it's already too late.

The question at hand is whether the complexity of x86 is seriously making low power design so difficult such that it's impossible to compete with ARM. I think with Intel's later offerings, it's clear that Intel is able to make some low power x86 processors that's competitive with other ARM solutions.

As for Skylake, I think it's very difficult to use the same micro-architecture over a huge spectrum, whether it's x86 or not. If IBM tries to downsize POWER8 into something for mobile phones it'd be a huge disaster. On the other hand, while A9X is probably nearly competitive with Core M, there's no A9X that's anywhere near high end x86 CPUs, so it's not clear whether A9 design is scalable to something like 4GHz. Also, Intel's advantage in process is geared toward high performance design. So such comparison is IMHO not showing the whole picture.
 
I think the reason why Intel is not successful in the mobile phone market is not because the performance of their SoC. Their performance/watt is actually competitive, but other factors make them unpopular.
And considering that now the phone SoC market is basically a cost game, it's not a market that Intel have much competitive edge.

Outside of whatever Apple, Samsung and Amazon sell in tablets, I can see today in the chinese tablets mostly Mediatek and Intel SoCs. I don't have any statistics but I think Intel managed to "sell" last year over 40Mio tablet SoCs for which I would think Mediatek has equal or comparable sales figures. And that obviously through subsidies for Intel. Smartphones are a completely different chapter and it's obviously a part of the market where it's harder to penetrate even with subsidies. In the meantime it's hard to find a chinese dual OS tablet these days that doesn't have an intel SoC inside or the majority of ultra cheap <$70 tablet tablets that have that Sofia crap integrated. I don't know what their sales goal is for this year, but I wouldn't be at all surprised if the sales volume ends up quite a bit higher than >40M.
 
Outside of whatever Apple, Samsung and Amazon sell in tablets, I can see today in the chinese tablets mostly Mediatek and Intel SoCs. I don't have any statistics but I think Intel managed to "sell" last year over 40Mio tablet SoCs for which I would think Mediatek has equal or comparable sales figures. And that obviously through subsidies for Intel. Smartphones are a completely different chapter and it's obviously a part of the market where it's harder to penetrate even with subsidies. In the meantime it's hard to find a chinese dual OS tablet these days that doesn't have an intel SoC inside or the majority of ultra cheap <$70 tablet tablets that have that Sofia crap integrated. I don't know what their sales goal is for this year, but I wouldn't be at all surprised if the sales volume ends up quite a bit higher than >40M.

Yes, tablet is a different story. Most cheap tablets do not have baseband and they are essentially cheap laptops without a keyboard. That's actually something Intel is quite familiar with.
 
Except recently in tablets, I'd say Intel did not really try seriously in the mobile space, until it was far too late. They never committed their leading edge manufacturing process to products that were supposed to target phones/tablets. Their first offering, Poulsbo was a 2 chip set, one @65nm and the other @130nm. This was when Intel was using 45nm for its CPUs. This remained/s a constant theme. Even merrifield/moorefield is 22nm when it could have been 14nm. And then there were the constant delays in the mobile timeline, which would again suggest that it was not a high enough priority.

The arguments about whether x86 is inherently not suitable for the low power space may well be valid, but at a time when Intel had a couple of node advantage over the rest of the manufacturing industry, they could have, had they so wished, decided to use that advantage to mask any inherent deficenicies and make top power/performance solutions. Clearly they did not see the money in it, or at the time did not have the excess manufacturing capability to do so. So, to that extent, they continued to focus on their traditional CPU business, and so I'd argue that they did not serious attack the mobile market.

Of course, I think it's clear now that a) Smartphone/Tablet socs are largely commoditised and therefore there they are not a prime profit option, and b) 3rd party foundries have significantly closed the gap to Intels advantage.

a) means that there isn't really the same money on a per chip basis, and b) means that the option to "process their way into the market" no longer exists to the extent that it did.
 
Personally, I don't really understand why Intel is so boneheaded these days on selling x86 into every marketspace. There's literally zero customer benefit (for either end-user, or OEM) to retain x86 legacy baggage in a hand-held product. You aren't going to run old Windows NT or MSDOS software on your god damned phone.

Intel's business is selling chips. They could just as well sell ARM chips as x86; probably better, as ARM has less architectural overhead, and is preferred by far by OEMs compared to x86.
 
This is way too much OT for the thread here, but I just came up with it since pcchen said that it isn't a power but rather cost issue. I can't imagine why anyone would want to buy Sofia except if it's for free or almost free, which actually rules out the cost part. Merrifield/Moorefield reached a few smartphone design wins, but none of the resulting devices sound so far like their super power efficient either, which may come down to other factors, but still.

To bounce back to the debate in question when it comes to power consumption for smartphone SoCs the A9X isn't obviously the best paradigm for that category either. Any Moorefield/Merrifield comparison would be better off against A8 or A7, since A9 is already another step ahead; the Intel chips are too dated for the latter.
 
Actually that's not what I meant. By cost game I mean the mobile phone SoC market is now so cost sensitive it's no longer in the interest of Intel.

The whole game started when people were talking about the so-called "post-PC era." Intel as we know it is THE PC company. The lion share of its profits come from desktop and laptop market, and it's declining rapidly. Intel naturally wanted to find their next big market. Since the main reason of
this so-called "post-PC" era is smartphone, it's not surprising that Intel wanted to try to enter this market.

However, a big problem with this strategy is that Intel is used to sell very high priced CPU. Most of their offerings have MSRP in three digits. This is why they can afford to spend a lot of money building the best fab and developing the best process. However, mobile phone SoC normally don't cost that much. People used to think that its volume can compensate for that, but now it's no longer obvious that it must be the case.

Now Intel seems to find it in a relatively comfortable space due to the "cloud boom," so they are now even less interested in the mobile phone market.
 
Personally, I don't really understand why Intel is so boneheaded these days on selling x86 into every marketspace. There's literally zero customer benefit (for either end-user, or OEM) to retain x86 legacy baggage in a hand-held product. You aren't going to run old Windows NT or MSDOS software on your god damned phone.
I definitely agree. Quark is the perfect example: they try hard to put that PoS that x86 ISA is into a tiny chip, and they tried so hard it's not really compatible with anything.

Intel's business is selling chips. They could just as well sell ARM chips as x86; probably better, as ARM has less architectural overhead, and is preferred by far by OEMs compared to x86.
It looks like they are getting serious about being a foundry player, even for ARM-based SoC if the latest rumors about LG and Intel are correct.

If Intel were really trying, they would actually make something from ground up with low power applications in mind, instead of simply tweaking a very old design into something not very good (e.g. the original Atom). Of course, they did something better later, but it's already too late.
Atom is a ground up CPU design with low power in mind, it certainly wasn't a tweak of an existing design. You should read the marketing presentations Intel put out back in 2008.
 
Intel is a chip merchant with fat gross margins. That's completely incompatible with the mobile phone mass market, where cost is everything.

The exception is the higher end of the mobile phone segment, but here we see vendors abandoning chip merchants and going for vertical integration, Apple with their own high performance SOCs, Samsung with Exynos (and soon with their own CPU core design too). The fatter margins in the high end segment can support custom design efforts, - not so in the mass market.

Intel is stuck with Qualcomm, MediaTek and other chip merchants in the medium-to-low-end mass market, where margins on SOCs are razor thin. That's not a good place to be for Intel.

Cheers
 
This is conventional wisdom.
It doesn't sit well with me however. I can´t quantify the x86 architectural cost, but it seems to be greater than the first order approximation would indicate.
To keep to the thread topic, the A9x sets the finger on the sore spot - how is it that Intel, who has the best fabs, a crystal clear architectural focus, tons of CPU design experience, and an R&D budget that is effectively limitless, still can't make a competitive x86 mobile chip? Surely, if the x86 penalty was small, all the undeniable strengths of Intel would compensate several times over?

To break out some of the assumptions:

Best fabs: In terms of high-performance digital logic processes, this generally undisputed. However, the era of Intel's dominance has only recently introduced processes more strongly aligned with the needs of mixed analog/digital SoC products and low power. Most likely, few would be near Intel's ability to achieve a usable active power consumption at 3-4 GHz speeds, but it's also the case that historically the designs that needed those features have not cared about idle and static power consumption that was far too high. Getting an SoC node was not immediate, and the turnaround time for changes in processes and which variants were rolled out first is lengthy. Density-wise, it took up until the most recent nodes for the foundries to make an economic decision to weaken their metal scaling at the same time that Intel decided to focus on it.

Clear architectural focus: It might be more unified compared to the fractured ARM market, but it has internal lines and politics. Atom is the low power line, but its initial success was more of a surprise and it was not given the same investment as the main lines. Its optimization and design goals were more modest until Silvermont really replumbed it. The same goes for Larrabee and the various chips up until the most recent Xeon Phi. That line did not receive significant physical design resources and it seems had constraints on the driver optimization resources it could have back when it had aspirations to take on GPUs. It did not receive a non-decrepit base core until the most recent one.
There was significant pushback against anything that would cannibalize the sales of the main-line cores, be it a large many-core HPC/server chip cutting into Xeon, and a too-performance cheap Atom cutting into x86 in the client PC range.

However, the lines that these specialized chips for a long time deferred to are the x86 big cores. Up until the most recent generation, we see Intel's mainline design with that vaunted 3-4 GHz fmax, increasingly wide dynamic range, high scaling potential, and very good physical design--at least for markets that enjoy orders of magnitude more power budget and margin. What we see with AVX-512 and the client/Xeon split is a sign that for all its vaunted resources, Intel seems to have reached a point where getting a design to cater to vector, integer, laptop, desktop, server, HPC, phone, etc. has finally reached a point on one or more exponential curves that even Intel cannot engineer around.
Also, we finally see with Phi and Silvermont examples of designs accomplished after Intel either managed to spin up the design effort or managed to fight back the entrenched interests of the mainline business that initially kept them out of some of that top-tier resourcing.

Given that many of these efforts (cores, interconnects, design targets) have lead times on the order of 3-5 years, the decision was probably made at a point that is both some time ago but frustratingly too late in terms of market changes versus lead time. However, that also means that they had to make some judgement calls on where the market was going, and that's where the Apple's designs might be a case where Intel's game of catch-up lead them to skating to where the puck was.

That's solely on the cores, however. In terms of SOC integration and associated IP, Intel has only recently been able to digest acquisitions for things like modem tech, which in terms of engineering and corporate integration take a long time. In terms of all the various things besides the CPUs that mobile manufacturers tend to care a lot more about, Intel was playing catch-up. There are rumors that it is doing a lot to convince Apple to use its modem.
Then there's the software, the lag in adopting sufficiently upscale GPU resources relative to the CPU allocation, etc.

And it is not for lack of trying either, they developed a new implementation of x86 to specifically go after low power applications, improved it iteratively, and when that failed to find customers Intel threw literally several billions in cash (contra revenue) at the manufacturers to get them to use their CPUs. Other than very effectively killing the low power x86 market for AMD, this has pretty much accomplished nothing.
Atom was initially more like a cheap x86 that was generally lowish in power. It took much longer to get a good low-power implementation. My earlier reference to skating to where the puck was: isn't Silvermont a more competitive to the ARM A9/A15/A57 implementations we've seen?
Getting something to beat the A9 would involve Intel expecting a core with the raw width and resources of a high-end x86, on a revamped ISA that ditched a lot of cruft that ARM had, with a significant design investment, and this core exists to service a specific niche. No 4GHz+ fmax, no high core count scaling, reduced SIMD width, limited introduction of non-relevant design features, more limited or more mobile-targeted dynamic range, etc. AMD's Excavator got measurably less embarrassing when it gave up a significant fraction of its fMax on an unimpressive architecture.

Beyond that, and possibly more relevant, those manufacturers that need to be coaxed into using an insurgent architecture, which Atom would be for mobile, are operating in a market where a CPU core is a widget that doesn't rank above a lot of other concerns. Also, Apple is making most of the profit in those markets, too. Intel is playing a game of catch-up, and the most it can aspire to when the endgame seems to be vertical component/device/content delivery/software/OS integration is an uppity component provider several layers down.

Apple is basically calling the shots at Intel's layer and above. Given how much pull Apple has for things like the large GPU Intel Core line, it can lead Intel around pretty directly.

Does x86 inject overhead? Sure. I think it was on the order of 10-15% on simpler cores. That alone would be surmountable.
However, the definition of competitive is not in Intel's control, and one of the powers that be that controls that definition and is leading vast swaths of the market by the nose is making the A9 and getting all the profits--of which a component provider would only see a tiny sliver of.
The A9 itself doesn't need to make a lot of money for itself to justify investment, that's what the phone/software/content stuff is for.

So, in summary:
Significant design lead times (not x86-specific)
Significant catch-up in non-CPU IP (not x86-specific)
Only recent shift from a period where a single core design across multiple orders of magnitude of power/performance/features/scaling was the assumed optimum (not x86-specific)
Significant organizational inertia (not x86-specific)
Market that gives significantly less money to a component provider (non-x86)
"Competitive" defined by someone who has been in the drivers seat for the market (non-x86)

edit:
One other thing that is more speculative is whether Intel has been trying to get a retargeted core architecture. There has definitely been changes since Sandy Bridge through Skylake, but I thought I saw some rumors of various new designs that never came to fruition. There is still the risk factor that a new design does not pan out, or fails to hit a sweet spot with the physical realities of manufacturing. The Pentium 4 on 90nm, or Bulldozer in general can show that a design's implementations can surprise designers who had to make judgement calls years before.
The latest FinFET nodes and the phone market are big changes for retargeting design priorities, but it doesn't strike me that the value-add for the various cores Intel has brought out have matched it, yet.
Signs of slowed rollouts and the physical split with the latest gen seem to point to a design transition that might be overdue.
 
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