Andy said:Short answer; No way!
XBox 360 uses DVD media, it's copyright protection I doubt will take that long to crack plus DVD Burners are readily available, and the fact that there is a 20GB HDD to boot, means there are many avenues to copy games.
PS3 on the other hand I'm sure will be cracked eventually, but will probably take longer than X360 to do so due to Blu-ray and the lack of Blu-ray burners for PC. PS3 will also have an HDD, of what size and whether its a separate add-on or not is yet to be revealed, but rest assure just like "HD-Loader" of this generation, something similar will likely arise.
Revolution, if also uses DVD Media, probably won't take too long to crack and should be quite easy to copy.
As for mod-chips, you can bet someone always finds a way, it's just a matter of time. The real question is, how long can you stop pirates and modchip manufacturers before they crack it?
london-boy said:If anything, it's gonna get worse. The more PC-like the consoles become, the more they open themselves up to piracy.
I mean, IBM is thinking about releasing open-source Linux for PS3?? For everyone? (PS2 had limited availability)
That's just asking for it.
Yes, but I'm pretty sure that would have some--if not a lot--of carry-over use.Sigma said:IBM is thinking about releasing open-source software for CELL, not the PS3...
Sigma said:london-boy said:If anything, it's gonna get worse. The more PC-like the consoles become, the more they open themselves up to piracy.
I mean, IBM is thinking about releasing open-source Linux for PS3?? For everyone? (PS2 had limited availability)
That's just asking for it.
IBM is thinking about releasing open-source software for CELL, not the PS3...
Approximately how big are the AES key sizes?
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits. In decimal terms, this means that there are approximately:
3.4 x 10^38 possible 128-bit keys;
6.2 x 10^57 possible 192-bit keys; and
1.1 x 10^77 possible 256-bit keys.
In comparison, DES keys are 56 bits long, which means there are approximately 7.2 x 10^16 possible DES keys. Thus, there are on the order of 10^21 times more AES 128-bit keys than DES 56-bit keys.
What is the chance that someone could use the "DES Cracker"-like hardware to crack an AES key?
In the late 1990s, specialized "DES Cracker" machines were built that could recover a DES key after a few hours. In other words, by trying possible key values, the hardware could determine which key was used to encrypt a message.
Assuming that one could build a machine that could recover a DES key in a second (i.e., try 2^55 keys per second), then it would take that machine approximately 149 thousand-billion (149 trillion) years to crack a 128-bit AES key. To put that into perspective, the universe is believed to be less than 20 billion years old.
http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/aesfact.html
Trusted Computing Frequently Asked Questions said:4. How does TC work?
TC provides for a monitoring and reporting component to be mounted in future PCs. The preferred implementation in the first phase of TC emphasised the role of a `Fritz' chip - a smartcard chip or dongle soldered to the motherboard. The current version has five components - the Fritz chip, a `curtained memory' feature in the CPU, a security kernel in the operating system (the `Nexus' in Microsoft language), a security kernel in each TC application (the `NCA' in Microsoft-speak) and a back-end infrastructure of online security servers maintained by hardware and software vendors to tie the whole thing together.
The initial version of TC had Fritz supervising the boot process, so that the PC ended up in a predictable state, with known hardware and software. The current version has Fritz as a passive monitoring component that stores the hash of the machine state on start-up. This hash is computed using details of the hardware (audio card, video card etc) and the software (O/S, drivers, etc). If the machine ends up in the approved state, Fritz will make available to the operating system the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt TC applications and data. If it ends up in the wrong state, the hash will be wrong and Fritz won't release the right key. The machine may still be able to run non-TC apps and access non-TC data, but protected material will be unavailable.
The operating system security kernel (the `Nexus') bridges the gap between the Fritz chip and the application security components (the `NCAs'). It checks that the hardware components are on the TCG approved list, that the software components have been signed, and that none of them has a serial number that has been revoked. If there are significant changes to the PC's configuration, the machine must go online to be re-certified: the operating system manages this. The result is a PC booted into a known state with an approved combination of hardware and software (whose licences have not expired). Finally, the Nexus works together with new `curtained memory' features in the CPU to stop any TC app from reading or writing another TC app's data. These new features are called `Lagrande Technology' (LT) for the Intel CPUs and `TrustZone' for the ARM.
Once the machine is in an approved state, with a TC app loaded and shielded from interference by any other software, Fritz will certify this to third parties. For example, he will do an authentication protocol with Disney to prove that his machine is a suitable recipient of `Snow White'. This will mean certifying that the PC is currently running an authorised application program - MediaPlayer, DisneyPlayer, whatever - with its NCA properly loaded and shielded by curtained memory against debuggers or other tools that could be used to rip the content. The Disney server then sends encrypted data, with a key that Fritz will use to unseal it. Fritz makes the key available only to the authorised application and only so long as the environment remains `trustworthy'. For this purpose, `trustworthy' is defined by the security policy downloaded from a server under the control of the application owner. This means that Disney can decide to release its premium content only to a media player whose author agrees to enforce certain conditions. These might include restrictions on what hardware and software you use, or where in the world you're located. They can involve payment: Disney might insist, for example, that the application collect a dollar every time you view the movie. The application itself can be rented too. The possibilities seem to be limited only by the marketers' imagination.
Shifty Geezer said:What happens when your machine dies/gets nicked/whatever? Do you have to buy all that stuff again because you can't prove you're the owner of the material when your machine no longer matches the specification of before?
ndoogoo said:MS have said the the xbox 360 is a very secure system. Do you think the modders will finally be defeated this round?