Citing the simpler DVD spec to explain the difficulty of BD+ sounds strange as AACS is already much more complicated than CSS anyway.aaaaa00 said:The whole point of SPDC/BD+ is that the copy protection system is embedded in the media itself and is controlled by the studios, not the hardware developers.
The SPDC/BD+ describes the virtual machine and the infrastructure that the protection system runs in, not the protection mechanisms themselves. So the studios are free to invent whatever non-standard protection checks and encryption methods they want -- which effectively means EVERY disc will have a non-standard protection technology -- otherwise the whole point of SPDC/BD+ is defeated.
In any case, regardless of how good the QA standards are, some players will get released that have bugs in them or do not implement some things correctly, especially at launch. Problems happened with the much simpler DVD spec and it'd be foolish to think the same won't happen with BD or HD DVD.
My impression is that unless it's detected that a player is tampered BD+ is not activated in the first place as it's just a fail-safe solution. Hardware manufacturers don't care about QA standards as it's the responsibility of media manufacturers to take care of new protection code that run on VM. Media manufacturers who don't want to take the risk of bugs won't add BD+ code to disc, period.
http://www.blu-raydisc.com/assets/downloadablefile/050809-13034.pdf
The BDA also adopted "BD+", a Blu-ray Disc specific programmable renewability enhancement that gives content providers an additional means to respond to organized attacks on the security system by allowing dynamic updates of compromised code. With these enhancements, content providers have a number of methods to choose from to combat hacks on Blu-ray players. Moreover, BD+ affects only players that have been attacked, as opposed to those that are vulnerable but haven't been attacked and therefore continue to operate properly.