What we are talking about isn't rocket science. As the article points out (I didn't type all 5 pages btw), change has been attempted before.
[size=-2]The need to replace small competitive teams with large collaborative ones did occur to a few key Sony executives. Toshitada Doi, a legendary engineer, set up a computer science lab in 1998 because he saw the future would require networked devices and large-scale software development. Years later, then-CEO Nobuyuki Idei reorganized Sony into a series of "network companies" and charged a promising lieutenant, Yuki Nozoe, with pulling together random broadband offerings into an all-encompassing networked future. But all this talk of networks was anathema to Sony's entrenched engineering cadre. Today, Doi, Idei, and Nozoe are all gone, victims of their failure to make a difference, swept away in the boardroom coup that in spring 2005 put Howard Stringer, a longtime media exec who'd been heading Sony's US operations, in charge of the company.[/size]
At heart, Sony is a traditional Japanese company: loyal and fiercely nationalistic. To have an outsider (who doesn't speak Japanese) at its helm does not bode well for company morale. :neutral:
Sony execs were at odds before Mr. Stringer and things haven't been hunky-dory since.
After reading these series of quotes, I only have random notes to share.
Can the failures really be attributed to Sony's engineering culture, or is it a failure for multiple groups to work coherently together ? e.g., content vs hardware divisions, software (long term, flexibility, reusable) vs hardware (short term, low cost), marketing vs engineering, etc. etc.
I have seen many cases where a "combined effort" fails because of fundamental differences in these disciplines. Sony's problem may be more acute due to its diversity.
IMHO, the highlighted Sony engineering culture may not be the culprit.
What Sony seems to need most (to rise above others) is a group of multi-disciplinary executives and teams who understands and execute across multiple domains (software + hardware + content) well. If they can master this, they will be formidable. Very few organizations can do that today.
So far, the PS3 represents a rally point for these activities (e.g., BR movies + game). So in that sense, it is part of the change.
As for the problem of compartmentalized development, Sony is definitely not alone. I know Logitech, Creative Technologies and MS have the same problem although they are (or rather everyone is) trying to change that. It arises because of a global market, fiercer competitors, timezone differences and a shortened development cycle.
What's more, one may not force the entire group to align to one effort if the buy-in is not there. Creative Technologies lost an excellent production subsidiary because they tried to force all its units to align behind its "Zen" product family months ago. The fact that Sony divisions are falling behind PS3 should be seen as a big plus.
Reorganization, as mentioned in your quoted article, helps a little but I don't think it is a permanent cure (since things and people change). Plus changes take time to take root and reflect. More importantly, previous attempt that rallies around abstract visions and goals can get derailed/side-tracked easily. With a *concrete* product like PS3 and a timeline, Sony may be more effective this time round, but time will tell.
Japanese organizations have their problems (most famous is the "Employee for life" mentality), US companies suffer from their own fallacies such as the "Manage by Quarterly Reports", "High Labor Cost", etc. In fact, Chinese and European entities all have their own cultural issues, I'm not sure how the article ranks their relative impact
So far, the highlighted problems are not unique to Sony (except for the names of the executives). Running a business, large or small, is tough and problematic. The article may do a good job collating Sony's history, but let's not take it for more than what it is.
