Before I respond to Archie; In responce to the origional question of why fixed nation-states are the problem in the WMD game and not virtual states like Al-Qaeda:
http://www.einaudi.cornell.edu/9-11/content/pdf/bioterrorism_vogel.pdf
archie4oz said:
Aum isn't even a 'he' it's a 'they', and it's not even Aum anymore it's Aleph...
I didn't remember Asahara's name, it's much easier to use a pronout then look it up.
I believe 'he' would be in reference to Shoko Asahara. Also the quality of the Aum's Sarin wasn't in question (it was quite capable as far as Sarin goes)
This is blatently false:
"Aum's Sarin was also of poor quality, having been synthesized hastily the day before and diluted with solvent so that the perpetrators would have time to escape before being overcome by the fumes. Had Aum produced high-grade Sarin and dispersed it as an aerosol--a fine, inhalable mist--the Tokyo attack could easily have inflicted thousands of causalties." http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/pdfs/toxter_i.pdf
Q - "How deadly was the sarin used in Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 attack?
A - Not very. Just prior to the attack, Aum hurriedly produced a low-lethality batch of sarin" http://www.terrorismanswers.com/weapons/sarin.html
"Despite the poor quality of the sarin and its inadequate delivery system, the scene under the streets of Tokyo that morning was terrifying" http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/attackdet.cfm?IncidentID=1033
"Due to the poor quality of the sarin gas and the inadequate delivery system, the casualty rate was low for a subway system that handles five million riders each day." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/etc/faqs.html
Just for an example with a fixed state, Iraq's Sarin which combined two precursors in a binary approach was of the following purity:
"
Given that the locally manufactured DF had a purity of more than 95 per cent and the alcohols were imported and of 100 per cent purity, this process could be expected to yield relatively pure sarin"http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/program.htm
Also they did succeed in producing strains of anthrax and various botulin toxins, however they weren't virulent enough (their anthrax being a vaccine strain) to kill the host before effective treatment could occur (which is a tricky balance with regards to biological agents since if it's too virulent it kills the host before it can spread).
And thats exactly my point, that without the help of dedicated and concurrent programs using the resources (not only financial as so many like to say) available to a fixed state - the production of weaponized Biological or Chemical weapons is close to none. For example:
First, as to what the group’ capabilities were and what they did do:
- They had virtually unlimited funds to procure appropriate equipment, which they did through front companies they had established.
- They had adequate facilities, and four years in which to work undisturbed.
- They had about a dozen people with graduate training, not all in the appropriate disciplines, but with the kind of academic training which in theory should lead one to understand how to go about learning what one needs to know.
- They had attempted to buy assistance and technology in the USSR to aid their efforts to produce both chemical and biological weapons, and despite the expenditure of several million dollars, they appear to have come away empty-handed, certainly insofar as obtaining information concerning biological weapons. This last point is particularly important as one real-world reference point relating to the frequently expressed fear of the likely ease of procuring such information from unemployed or poorly-salaried former Soviet experts. (It can also be noted that there have been other even more striking failures in efforts to buy information from former Soviet BW scientists.)
Second, concerning what the Aum group was able to achieve or not achieve:
- They attempted to produce two biological agents, Clostridium botulinum, to obtain Botulinum toxin, and anthrax, both of which are constantly referred to as organisms that should be relatively simple to work with. They failed to produce either, and so of course their efforts to “disperse†these also failed. In fact, they could not have produced any infective anthrax since they had obtained a culture of a non-virulent, denatured vaccine strain of the organism.
- They did not have any Q-fever cultures, and therefore they were not “working with†that organism (contrary to various reports). They had attempted to purchase a Q-fever culture from a Japanese academic researcher, but were rebuffed, which is again of particular significance.
- They did not have samples of the Ebola virus, contrary to various reports, though it does appear that they had hoped to obtain them.
- Finally, they did not do any “genetic engineering,†also contrary to some further misreporting.
There are two important points to be made. First, the Aum experience was a real, serious example, not the constant hypothetical evocations of unqualified, untrained “terrorists†being able to produce biological agents in “kitchens,†“garages,†“bathtubs,†and “home beer brewery kits.†Despite the expenditure of substantial time, effort, money and some requisite talent, their efforts totally failed.
http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/review/exp.htm
Actually the Aum killed 7 people in their first major attack (which wasn't the Tokyo subway attack which killed 12 and injured around 5000).
Your right, I stand corrected on the number killed. Although, only ~300 were injured, the 5,000 number is the amount of people who were hospitalized. (Which is seen in the above FAS paper)
In total the National Police found the Aum to have produced enough Sarin to kill roughly 4.8 million people with proper dispersion. That of course doesn't include the VX, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide found after raiding their chemical facilities...
If i'm not mistaken, Aum had produced GB on only three occasions before the plant was shut down due to an accident, producing 30kg during the last of 3 times, which 20kg was used.
Also, they chose GB for a reason, it's perhaps the easiest Chemical Agent to make and the precursors are easy to find. This being said, they had the precursors to produce tons of GB, but not the ability.
Also, the stores of VX produced, for example, were tiny.
The underlying point here is that even with a Billion dollar empire, the will, and educated talent - a virtual state/entity like this can't weaponize Chemical/Biological weapons that are effective. It takes a state, like Iraq or North Korea. I often say history is the final judge and thus far...
.. Virtual states who've produced their own WMD have killed under 200 people in the last 25 years. On the Fixed state side, Iraq alone killed over 20,000 Iranians - only Iranians with Chemical or blister agents in 10 years. Thats not even counting the Kurdish villages totally destroyed.
