Hey Fred, I have some questions for you and Democoder, harking back to my origional post instead of just responding to repsonces of responces ():
Your argument states that *you* will wake up, seemingly making a trip to Paris while sleeping without a discontinuity. My argument states that you will die, yet an analogous entity, crafted out of new material, will wake up in Paris without a dicontinuity -- lucky him. As follows from the world-line concept, which I'll touch on later, but for now:
Interesting, I was thinking at work that I should mention that while the output of the teleportation device could pass a 'Turing Test'-esque test, that doesn't explicitly mean that (a) I won't die upon entry of the teleportation device, while a copy emerges, (b) I have achieved immortality in anything but an abstract ideal.
Which brings up my next point: If immortality is defined by something as simple of a bound as a Turing Test, then we can already achieve immortality via memetics and years of studying. Einstein can be *proven* to be alive, untill the screen is moved and a buddhist monk is sitting there. Yet, oddly enough, I doubt either you or Democoder will consider cultural evolution and epistemology to be tantamount to immortality.
Also, while I'm responding to you. How often do you apply QM concepts as you've cited to macroscopic objects on the scale of the human body? Can you give me an example?
And, subsequent to that, can you demonstrate a macroscopic object (on the same order) that exhibits such an infinite worldline. Which I'm applying as an abstract concept as it is, but I fail to see how it's inapplicable when talking about such systems as we are that are deterministic and, by your and Demo's own admission, classical.
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Vince said:So, if we assume that at the exact instant I lose consciosuness as I go to sleep tonight, a 3rd party extracts all the information allowable by uncertainty from me (which as you said, assuming a strictly NN derived model is more than acceptable for neural modeling). As I sleep, we can assume no external stimulii and analogous biological properties just for argument. This 3rd party makes a copy of me in Paris and kills the initial entity.
You're telling me I'm going to wake-up in Paris?
Your argument states that *you* will wake up, seemingly making a trip to Paris while sleeping without a discontinuity. My argument states that you will die, yet an analogous entity, crafted out of new material, will wake up in Paris without a dicontinuity -- lucky him. As follows from the world-line concept, which I'll touch on later, but for now:
- What mechanism allows for you, assuming a 1:1 mapping of consciosuness to the specific underlying biological matter, to survive the destruction of the origional copy and make the spatial 'transit' to Paris?
- What happens if we transport him, but don't kill him. Will he be analogous to a non-local quantum system? What if we make infinite copies, will you wake-up in infinite locations, able to extract and assimilate external stimulii from all copies?
Fred said:2)I claim that the only reasonable quantitative test of identity would come from bounds on a Turing test.
Obviously Vince, and Vince + 30seconds are going to give a different Turing test in the limit of infinite questions.
So too would Vince clone at t = 0, and Vince original at t=0.. Merely by inexact equations and 'experimental' uncertainty
However you probably could impose a (sanity) bound to the test so that identity could be defined as the set ~ Vince mod (vince +- some time t, where t is fairly small).
I claim that you could probably close the clone into that bound, such that a sanity bound Turing test would yield identical results.
Interesting, I was thinking at work that I should mention that while the output of the teleportation device could pass a 'Turing Test'-esque test, that doesn't explicitly mean that (a) I won't die upon entry of the teleportation device, while a copy emerges, (b) I have achieved immortality in anything but an abstract ideal.
Which brings up my next point: If immortality is defined by something as simple of a bound as a Turing Test, then we can already achieve immortality via memetics and years of studying. Einstein can be *proven* to be alive, untill the screen is moved and a buddhist monk is sitting there. Yet, oddly enough, I doubt either you or Democoder will consider cultural evolution and epistemology to be tantamount to immortality.
Also, while I'm responding to you. How often do you apply QM concepts as you've cited to macroscopic objects on the scale of the human body? Can you give me an example?
And, subsequent to that, can you demonstrate a macroscopic object (on the same order) that exhibits such an infinite worldline. Which I'm applying as an abstract concept as it is, but I fail to see how it's inapplicable when talking about such systems as we are that are deterministic and, by your and Demo's own admission, classical.