Let me comment a few things:
"On the other hand, Huang is a realistic and smart guy and is likely to take dramatic actions to correct this path (if the Board of Directors lets him, that is)."
Well, I don't see how the board of directors could say "No." to Jen Hsun Huang. He owns 10% of the company's stock, is one of the co-founders and seems to have nearly inconditional support from his employees.
Jen Hsun Huang, IMO, is a great CEO and President. However, I also fear he's way too optimistic.
Strangely, I believe he's the one who put nVidia into this NV30 mess. He actually said it indirectly himself.
He's the one who asked the NV30 team to achieve "Cinematic Computing". He said it himself. And really, with a so aggressive objective, it was obvious they had to shoot for very aggressive specs: 0.13 and high-end GDDR-II made a lot of sense at the time.
The problem, however, was that both of these made a August release impossible. And nVidia didn't get as fast GDDR-II as they hoped for.
So, as you see, it's Huang who indirectly created all of this mess. But I'm sure he's a smart man, and won't do the same mistakes again.
"The best thing for NVidia to do at this point is to recognize that they have indeed lost this battle and focus their attention on the market that actually pays for all this amazing chip design: the budget category. "
As other people said, the split of profit between high-end and low-end is pretty much 50/50.
My understanding of nVidia's 2003 strategy is simple:
1. Release the NV31/NV34 ( and maybe NV33 ) for the mid-end and low-end respectively. Shoot for the price/performance ratio.
2. Release the NV35 between the R350 and R400 release, gaining the performance crown.
3. Release the NV36 after the R400, to compete with the traditional R400 mid-end solutions and keep the mid-end market ( as well as increasing their lead in workstation & high-end mobile )
4. Release a NV33/NV34/NV35 refresh ( based on the same ASIC ) *if* such products would have any use. The 0.13 process is more mature, so higher clocks or lower price is authorized. A NV35 refresh will only happen if the R400 isn't much faster than the NV35, which is hard to predict ( hard to guess if ATI will deliver or not with the ambitious R400 architecture )
That roadmap will work very well unless:
- The RV350 is a revolution and beats the NV31 by a nice margin
- The R400 beats the NV35 by more than 25% ( which would result in increasing ATI's brand value )
- One of the products got unforseen problems ( the NV31 is currently expected to have problems reaching a high clock-speed, so it'll be interesting to see how much of a problem against the RV350 that'll create )
Uttar
"On the other hand, Huang is a realistic and smart guy and is likely to take dramatic actions to correct this path (if the Board of Directors lets him, that is)."
Well, I don't see how the board of directors could say "No." to Jen Hsun Huang. He owns 10% of the company's stock, is one of the co-founders and seems to have nearly inconditional support from his employees.
Jen Hsun Huang, IMO, is a great CEO and President. However, I also fear he's way too optimistic.
Strangely, I believe he's the one who put nVidia into this NV30 mess. He actually said it indirectly himself.
He's the one who asked the NV30 team to achieve "Cinematic Computing". He said it himself. And really, with a so aggressive objective, it was obvious they had to shoot for very aggressive specs: 0.13 and high-end GDDR-II made a lot of sense at the time.
The problem, however, was that both of these made a August release impossible. And nVidia didn't get as fast GDDR-II as they hoped for.
So, as you see, it's Huang who indirectly created all of this mess. But I'm sure he's a smart man, and won't do the same mistakes again.
"The best thing for NVidia to do at this point is to recognize that they have indeed lost this battle and focus their attention on the market that actually pays for all this amazing chip design: the budget category. "
As other people said, the split of profit between high-end and low-end is pretty much 50/50.
My understanding of nVidia's 2003 strategy is simple:
1. Release the NV31/NV34 ( and maybe NV33 ) for the mid-end and low-end respectively. Shoot for the price/performance ratio.
2. Release the NV35 between the R350 and R400 release, gaining the performance crown.
3. Release the NV36 after the R400, to compete with the traditional R400 mid-end solutions and keep the mid-end market ( as well as increasing their lead in workstation & high-end mobile )
4. Release a NV33/NV34/NV35 refresh ( based on the same ASIC ) *if* such products would have any use. The 0.13 process is more mature, so higher clocks or lower price is authorized. A NV35 refresh will only happen if the R400 isn't much faster than the NV35, which is hard to predict ( hard to guess if ATI will deliver or not with the ambitious R400 architecture )
That roadmap will work very well unless:
- The RV350 is a revolution and beats the NV31 by a nice margin
- The R400 beats the NV35 by more than 25% ( which would result in increasing ATI's brand value )
- One of the products got unforseen problems ( the NV31 is currently expected to have problems reaching a high clock-speed, so it'll be interesting to see how much of a problem against the RV350 that'll create )
Uttar