The answer to that one is simple - it makes a difference, but not a decisive difference.
It's a bit philosophical to ask if a difference that doesn't make a change to decision making is a materially significant one.
If it was possible for Intel to be competitive in this segment, why aren't they, almost a decade after they started their efforts?
I think there are some legitimate technical and IP reasons, which Intel has been working to correct.
Things like the purchase of Infineon wireless (the initial lack of this kind of tech is where my initial personal evaluation of Intel's efforts was dismissive) and the creation of an SoC process to provide the expected features and provide silicon that is outside of Intel's traditional strength in high-performance but comparatively leaky digital logic with insufficient support for mixed signal.
The combination of the IP and physical acquisitions hasn't quite happened yet, but there is an apparent will to make a real effort.
Inertia and margin concerns are another that would have added drag to any change in direction.
As Intel improves its products from a technical and physical standpoint, non-technical reasons become more dominant.
It's only fair, I suppose, that x86 find itself in this situation as it wasn't technical reasons that gave it supremacy in the first place.
If Intel managed to become competitive, why would the two parties that make money in mobile, Apple and Samsung, choose to become dependent on them?
Without something compelling, I'm not sure why they would. They provide platforms, so the amount of bother they are willing to accept for a component is commensurate to that reduced status.
If Intel managed to get to 5-7nm with significant power/performance advantages and significant cost savings that the foundries effectively could not get to while being stranded on a 20-16nm range with production issues (might not be as impossible as some other alternatives), it might matter if the manufacturers start fighting for some kind of competitive edge once the mobile market becomes mature.
One problem for providing a platform component without a much better scheme for software portability is that dual-sourcing concerns come into play for x86, much as they did back in the day.
The only secondary source of note right now, however, is either incapable of or unwilling to function in that role.
Why would Intel even try to compete with for instance Qualcomm and Mediatek in a struggle for bottom feeder market share? Could it ever offer a very good ROI by Intels standards?
That's a question of a lot of silicon chasing markets that were not growing with Moore's Law.
Even before the current situation, there was concern about the end game with deep sub-micron processes and larger wafers making it so the whole world's demand of silicon could be managed by several massive (and exponentially more expensive) fabs.
Intel's success is bound in a feedback loop of physical and design success fed by the revenue feeding into the same. However that cycle is run on an increasingly top-heavy, front-heavy, and glass-jawed paradigm, and it seems Intel's foundry, memory production, and capital conservation motions are indicative of the difficulty of that problem.
However, Intel is still profitable enough such that it has the means and time to keep trying to break through that barrier or to work around it.
In the case of lithography tools and the like, it's a field Intel originally felt was economical to no longer do in-house, but may not evalaute as such if other pressures persist.
ASML, and the pond it operates in, is an order of magnitude smaller. That doesn't mean Intel can just replace it, at least not in total. If Intel can get something like exclusive access or independent development of a subset of tools needed for EUV, 450mm, or sub-7nm geometries, it won't need to.
However, the big money is in getting a stranglehold on consumers, and the consumption platform owners have their own concerns for profitability. In that regard, they are the bigger fish with a bigger pond, and their efforts have already had knock-on effects as they route revenues to different architectural directions. Other things, like the increasingly less open technical disclosures and emphasis on lock-down are perhaps another sign of the times.