If someone can fake SSL(or TLS) certificate with a man in the middle attack, there is a much bigger problem.
Considering the PSN servers were compromised, and those same servers had SSL certificates *and* keys installed (for Apache, an OpenSSL keystore) on them, presumably, those SSL certs were compromised.
If they had bothered to capture the SSL traffic (using tcpdump for example), they would have all they need to capture the data (not quite a man-in-the-middle attack, more like a "man at the end" attack) and decrypt the traffic (with the SSL key).
Obviously, they would only have whatever was in that captured stream... there could be CC data, or not depending on what people were doing.
Of course, this scenario makes lots of assumptions, such as Sony didn't use a secure passphrase for the keystore, etc... but even if they did, that can be brute-force discovered. Many other assumptions exist.
In IT security, when you have an intruder, you have to assume they have everything.