Very interesting insight xbd. I do subscribe in some part to the theory that the level of the razor blade model’s subsidy may have been influenced by Stringer or the new management, certainly I do not believe the analysts estimations on total product costs, they are almost certainly over-estimations since it would be dangerous to undervalue. However the way in which SCEI has almost seemed lackadaisical on the software side – e.g. XMB was not as fleshed out as it should have been at launch – suggests to me that there are certain inefficiencies in the management structure there.
In my view...
I think the inclusion of Blu-ray, HDMI 1.3, and Cell in PS3 was planned very early by Kutaragi. However the pricing may have been revised with Howard Stringer given his goals to improve margin and hit profitability target. They may have saved on marketing dollars this FY too (partly explained the missing "air-cover" for PS3 launch).
As for the anemic bundled software, I think it's due to the "newness". They probably needed to structure the accounting, do the software group hiring, learn multi-core programming the hard way (with immature tools), and figure out how best to work together. Given that Toshiba is no-show for Cell so far, the process is probably non-trivial. I also suspect the late arrival of some key software has left Sony marketing little time to prepare for the launch.
Sony still has a lot to do before software, and vertical integration becomes second nature, but I'm glad they started the process (This is one of the few articles acknowledging it).
I expect the March firmware revision to add more Cell capability (e.g., voice and video communications), but the UI may need yet another refresh. A software architect may not (have time to) address usability issues.
As for inefficiency in management structure...
I hope Stringer does not get carried away with quarterly SEC reports. Short term vs long term outlook is probably a hot topic for boardroom debate. So far, he is addressing some of the key issues, while trying to stay out of the way from the division heads.
One key challenge with these cross-group integrations is usually ownership and reward/measurement structure (Who decides what gets done ultimately, and who gets punished/rewarded for it).
e.g., Talladega Night is a lousy choice for showcasing Blu-ray, why choose it ? Is it because the movie group wants to save all the good stuff for revenue generation, or the Blu-ray promotion budget is tight, or is it just oversight ? If SCE disagrees with using TN as a demo disc, can they change it ? How ?
From the interview...
It seems that Stringer needs a technical advisor, like Chubachi, to accompany him (especially for tech-site interviews). The latter can take technical questions, or clarify them after Stringer's answers.
Actually, what the interview tells me is that Stringer has not fully assimilated SCE's dynamics yet. He probably needs better indicators and up-to-date competitor analysis too (That 60,000 number may come from a very old report). These intuition can be useful for dreaming up his own ideas, or finding flaws in arguments.
Ironically, the fault lies with SCE. The day PS3 becomes easy to understand to Stringer is the day PS3 hit the "hockey stick" curve. Now it's a long list of features and technical powess... instead of a simple experience.