JF_Aidan_Pryde
Regular
I've been reading The Age of Spritual Machines after seeing it referenced by a lot of the bright fellas of today (Kirk etc.)
The part on 'copying' a human or 'uploading' our brain to a computer got me thinking.
There are different interpretations of what makes 'self'. It could be - 'the unique' atomic comfiguration of your brain at any given time. By this I mean only the current set of atoms are acceptable. If you are to replace a carbon atom by an identical one, then that's not you.
But this can't be the case. Since identical elements are indistinguishable by nature, and our body replaces cells frequently, then which particular 'carbon' atom is used to construct a particular cell is irrelavent. So this would mean what makes 'self' is like a flowing river. It doesn't matter which water molecules are in the river, it only matters that it's in a particular form and flows a particular way.
So this would mean there shouldn't be any problem with 'teleporting'/'uploading' yourself by copying the configuration but not the acutal contents. But this isn't the case either. After I've been copied to a computer, it will claim to be me, but I'll still be here claiming that's just a copy. Someone would have to kill me to make it seem like a upload. That obviously isn't right either.
If I replace one neuron in my head, I'm pretty sure I'm still myself. But what about 10? 100? 100 000? Somewhere along the line, I would have 'killed' myself no? So replacing one = normal, replacing a lot = kill. Where does one draw the line between replacement and killing?
The part on 'copying' a human or 'uploading' our brain to a computer got me thinking.
There are different interpretations of what makes 'self'. It could be - 'the unique' atomic comfiguration of your brain at any given time. By this I mean only the current set of atoms are acceptable. If you are to replace a carbon atom by an identical one, then that's not you.
But this can't be the case. Since identical elements are indistinguishable by nature, and our body replaces cells frequently, then which particular 'carbon' atom is used to construct a particular cell is irrelavent. So this would mean what makes 'self' is like a flowing river. It doesn't matter which water molecules are in the river, it only matters that it's in a particular form and flows a particular way.
So this would mean there shouldn't be any problem with 'teleporting'/'uploading' yourself by copying the configuration but not the acutal contents. But this isn't the case either. After I've been copied to a computer, it will claim to be me, but I'll still be here claiming that's just a copy. Someone would have to kill me to make it seem like a upload. That obviously isn't right either.
If I replace one neuron in my head, I'm pretty sure I'm still myself. But what about 10? 100? 100 000? Somewhere along the line, I would have 'killed' myself no? So replacing one = normal, replacing a lot = kill. Where does one draw the line between replacement and killing?